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Executive Summary 
 
Historic observations and projected models show a trend of declining sea-ice in the 
Arctic as a result of global climate change. Sea-ice is the largest obstacle to Arctic maritime 
transportation, and given these predictions, reductions of sea-ice extent in the Arctic Ocean will 
create new opportunities for the global transportation industry by opening up navigable passages. 
As new navigable passages and transit routes are opening up in the Arctic, one sector 
taking advantage of these open waters is the maritime transportation industry. Shipping is an 
environmentally efficient and cost-effective method for the international transportation of 
consumer goods, and as a result, the industry touches more than 90% of global trade. For this 
industry, the Arctic represents efficiencies via time and fuel saving routes and greater 
connectivity between major international ports. Adjacent and non-polar nations are increasing 
their capacity to take advantage of these new routes, many of which may prove economically 
advantageous for international commerce.  
The dramatic transformation brought about by climate change is catalyzing a reevaluation 
and reorganization of global governance. Various governance regimes have emerged to manage 
this growing activity, including an expansion of the treaties under the International Maritime 
Organization and an increase in the scope of the Arctic Council. Governance actors have been 
tasked with managing the safety, infrastructure, and environmental impacts of Arctic 
transportation activities.  
This paper synthesizes international, regional, and national scale governance regimes that 
collectively manage jurisdictional, infrastructural, and environmental issues of maritime 
transportation activities. The primary regimes in the Arctic are the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Arctic 
Council, national regimes, and the private transportation sector.  
Drawing on contemporary understandings of governance, these governance regimes are 
evaluated based on seven principles of global environmental governance. Global environmental 
governance should: 
1. Be situated in a globalized world, 
2. Be appropriate for local context, 
3. Be inclusive of non-state actors, especially industry, 
4. Produce knowledge, 
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5. Provide sufficient infrastructure, including capacity for enforcement, 
6. Ensure environmental protection, and 
7. Be flexible and adaptable.  
The above components of global environmental governance have all been identified as 
appropriate and relevant in the Arctic and/or for the maritime transportation industry.  
Each of the existing Arctic institutions is fulfilling at least one of the governance 
principles, indicating that existing governance institutions successfully contribute to overall 
governance in the region. Yet there are still gaps that impair Arctic governance from functioning 
as a cohesive form of global environmental governance. Of the various governance regimes 
proposed by Arctic scholars to manage the changing region, I argue for an expansion of the 
Arctic Council that would facilitate a networked governance regime in the Arctic. A networked 
regime – a combination of multilevel, niche, and hybrid governance – recognizes the successful 
attributes of existing regimes and strives to connect them all in a network of governance to 
collectively and comprehensively manage the natural resources of a region.  
Growing maritime transportation activities in the Arctic will face opportunities and 
threats associated with the environmental, political, and socioeconomic conditions unique to the 
region. A networked governance regime in the Arctic would effectively manage the maritime 
transportation industry to mitigate and minimize environmental harms while achieving the 
greatest resource benefits for society. 
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I. Introduction 
 Climate change is altering the biophysical world around us. Nowhere are these changes 
more easily visualized than in the Arctic, an area covering the polar region of the Northern 
hemisphere. In the Arctic, climate change is leading to a warming of air and sea surface 
temperatures, resulting in dramatic impacts on the regional ecosystems (Maslowski et al., 2012). 
One example of this change is the overall decline in sea-ice extent. As the Arctic warms, there is 
a trend of decreasing sea-ice extent, leaving previously ice-covered areas of the Arctic Ocean 
now ice-free.  
 As the sea-ice extent decreases, new navigable passages and transit routes are opening up 
in the Arctic, and one sector predicted to take advantage of these changes is the maritime 
transportation industry. For this industry, the Arctic represents efficiencies via time and fuel 
saving routes and greater connectivity between major international ports. Transportation 
activities in the Arctic will face a set of opportunities and risks associated with the 
environmental, political, and socioeconomic conditions unique to the region (IMO, 2015). These 
risks need to be planned for in order to fully realize the opportunities (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012).   
Responses to climate change look either to minimize greenhouse gas emissions or 
increase social adaptive capacity to respond to changing conditions (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). 
Governance in the Arctic approaches climate change from the latter perspective, and considers 
how to appropriately govern in a constantly changing environment. The dramatic transformation 
brought about by climate change is catalyzing a reevaluation and reorganization of global 
governance. 
A strong governance framework is needed to take advantage of opportunities in the 
Arctic in a sustainable manner (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012). Various regimes have emerged to 
manage activities, including maritime transportation, in the Arctic. This paper explores the 
development of some of the major governance institutions that exist and evaluates them 
according to principles of global environmental governance. Maritime transportation is a matter 
of “life and death, injury, pollution, terrorism, jobs and prosperity,” and therefore needs to be 
effectively managed and organized (Roe, 2007, Pg. 100) to mitigate and minimize environmental 
harms while achieving the greatest resource benefits for society. 
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II. Climate Change in the Arctic  
Predominately non-Arctic forces drive climate change, yet the polar latitudes are seeing 
the most dramatic changes (Young, 2012). Due to polar amplification, the process by which the 
poles experience a greater change in surface and air temperatures, the impacts of climate change 
are more pronounced in the Arctic, particularly obvious in the loss of perennial ice and reduced 
extent of the summer ice-minimum. In conjunction, the thickness of sea-ice has been decreasing; 
warmer air temperatures lead to surface ice melt and warmer waters lead to below-ice melt. 
Factors that influence sea-ice cover include changing air-sea heat fluxes and ice-albedo 
feedback, which in turn increases Earth’s absorption of solar radiation. A decrease in sea-ice is 
believed to be the greatest positive feedback mechanism contributing to polar amplification 
(Maslowski et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 1: Decreasing sea-ice extent from historical and projected models. (Humpert & Raspotnik, 2012) 
Declining sea-ice in the Arctic is an indicator of global climate change. Historical trends 
from satellite records between 1979 and 2010 show that the September sea-ice minimum is 
declining at a rate greater than 11% per decade. This rate has accelerated within the last decade 
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to the extent that the September minimum has been below two standard deviations of the mean 
ice extent (Kattsov et al., 2010). The 2007 minimum was almost 40% below the 1979-2010 
average (Maslowski et al., 2012). That equates to approximately 25% loss of the total sea ice 
extent since 1979, and a decrease of about 100,000 km2 per year (Boé et al., 2009). These trends 
are predicted to continue and accelerate in the future (Figure 1) (Smith & Stephenson, 2013).  
There is a large spread and much inconsistency between modeled results of predicted ice 
coverage in the Arctic (Boé et al., 2009; Ho, 2010). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) Relative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5 model, the most dramatic of the 
IPCC models and a high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions scenario (Riahi et al., 2011), is 
conservative when compared with existing literature on modeled sea-ice extent (Wang & 
Overland, 2012). IPCC 4.5, a medium GHG emissions pathway predicts an ice-free minimum 
September extent by the end of the 21st century (Boé et al., 2009). Ice-free conditions in the 
Arctic are defined as an extent of ice coverage less than 1 million km2. 
Global Climate Models used by the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment show a 50% 
reduction in summer sea-ice cover by the end of the 21st century while IPCC AR4 models and 
Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 3 (CMIP3) project an almost ice-free summer by 
the end of the century (Maslowski et al., 2012). Overland and Wang predict a nearly ice-free 
Arctic by the 2030s (Wang & Overland, 2012). Current climate models are often more 
conservative than satellite data (Smith & Stephenson, 2013). Models do not include all the 
known global climate forcings; for example they do not include the potential warming from 
thawing methane in Arctic lakes (Ho, 2010) that would increase the rate of sea-ice decline. 
Climate change will cause a reduction in the extent of the Arctic sea-ice minimum 
(Maslowski et al., 2012). The decline of the September Arctic ice minimum represents social, 
climatological, and ecological threats and economic opportunities (Wang & Overland, 2012). 
Transportation dependent on open waters in the Arctic will potentially benefit from the impacts 
of climate change.  
 
III. Maritime Transportation in the Arctic 
Declining sea-ice creates an opportunity for the global maritime transportation industry to 
utilize new trade routes. Given the predictions described above, sea-ice extent declines in the 
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Arctic Ocean will positively impact the global maritime transportation industry by opening up 
new navigable routes. Rising prices of fuel, growing markets for minerals, and interests in 
hydrocarbon resources have catalyzed transportation activities in the Arctic (Stokke, 2012). 
Sea ice is the “single greatest obstacle to trans-Arctic shipping,” but other concerns 
include lack of services and infrastructure in the Arctic to support the transportation industry, 
high insurance and escort fees, unknown response of the Suez and Panama canals that would 
increase their relative competitiveness, and inadequate charts to guide navigation (Smith & 
Stephenson, 2013). Adjacent and non-polar nations are increasing their capacity to take 
advantage of these new routes, many of which will be economically advantageous for 
international commerce. 
 
A. New Opportunities for the Transportation Industry 
Maritime transportation activities are expected to grow in volume and diversity in the 
coming decades (Arctic Council, 2009; Ebinger et al., 2014; IMO, 2015; Smith & Stephenson, 
2013). Trans-Artic transportation provides many opportunities for the global shipping industry 
and major shipping nations in the region are building up their icebreaking fleets to take 
advantage of these opportunities (Geiselhart, 2014). Transportation between the Pacific and 
Atlantic via the Arctic can be up to 5000 miles and a week shorter than transit through the Suez 
and Panama Canals (Figure 2) (Geiselhart, 2014; Ho, 2010). This could result in a significant 
reduction of fuel costs and canal fees for shipping companies, saving the industry billions of 
dollars per year. Likewise, waters in the Arctic are deeper than the Panama Canal, allowing 
passage of a growing class of supertankers that have a draft too long for the canals to 
accommodate (Borgerson, 2008). To fully develop a shipping industry in the Arctic there will be 
some necessary infrastructural investments pertaining to feasibility, safety, and environmental 
impact of these activities (Ho, 2010).  
 
B. Navigable Routes 
The two most prominent routes through the Arctic are the Northern Sea Route (NSR), 
which passes over northern Russia and is also known as the Northeast Passage, and the 
Northwest Passage (NWP), which traverses the waters of northern Canada (Figure 2).  
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September is the month where transit through the Arctic is most likely, as that is when 
sea ice is at its minimum. Modeled ice distribution indicates that open-water vessels will be able 
to transit sooner through the NSR, while passage through the NWP would be more likely to 
necessitate ice-strengthened vessels in the foreseeable future (Smith & Stephenson, 2013). 
According to a survey of various climate models, there is an increasing feasibility of open water 
(unstrengthened) vessels to transit the Arctic along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) increasing in 
frequency and expanding geographically by 2040-2059. The Northwest Passage (NWP) 
currently has much less navigability due to ice density than the NSR, but will become 
increasingly more open and accessible by the 2040-2059 period. The NWP is always a more 
efficient Arctic passage for any ice-strengthened vessels transiting from any ports along eastern 
North America. These are predictions made by climate models, which are often quite 
conservative when compared to reality of sea ice extent and thickness (Boé et al., 2009; Smith & 
Stephenson, 2013). 
 
Figure 2: Navigable sea lanes in the Arctic. Inset map shows relative comparison of journey with a route through the Suez Canal. 
(CNA, 2014) 
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Routes along the coast of Serbia and parts of the NSR are expected to be navigable much 
earlier than the NWP. In 2007, 2.13 million tonnes of cargo were transported through the Arctic 
along the NSR (Ho, 2010). Non-Russian vessels first started accessing the NSR in 2004 and the 
first ice-free trans-Arctic transit occurred in 2008 (Ho, 2010). The first commercial voyages were 
made in the NSR in 1997, but by 2011 only four ships had made the transit. In 2013, 71 
commercials ships transited across the Arctic using the NSR, a dramatic increase from past years 
(Thomson, 2014). For comparison, approximately 19,000 vessels utilize the Suez Canal each 
year (Palmer, 2013).There is much potential for increasing transportation activities in the Arctic 
as the length of the season increases with a warming Arctic (Geiselhart, 2014). With melting sea-
ice, there is also an overall increase in the number of navigable days. Currently, there are 50 
navigable days in the Arctic, but by 2050, the IPCC predicts as many as 125 navigable days via 
the NSR (Larsen et al., 2014). Since IPCC climate predictions are on the conservative side, it can 
be imagined that this number may be much greater by 2050.  
The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (Arctic Council, 2009) is conservative 
regarding trans-polar transportation, predicting that much of the activity will be dominated by 
increasing regional transportation within the Arctic, directly adjacent. There has also been 
increased regional traffic centralized around areas of new hydrocarbon resource development, de 
facto shuttle services between offshore rigs and their onshore support infrastructure (PAME, 
2013). The AMSA predicts that coastal and port access and infrastructure will all be improved in 
these areas. Ho proposes that what is more likely is that there will be an increase in foreign 
research, merchant vessels through the NSR (Ho, 2010). The sector of transportation also 
influences interest in Arctic transit. A survey by Lasserre and Pelletier (2011) showed that 
container vessels were not interested in Arctic passage. Similarly sectors that were constrained 
by timing, or operated on a “just in time” schedule like RoRo (roll on roll off vessels), could not 
risk possible delays in the Arctic due to ice conditions (Lasserre & Pelletier, 2011). In their 
survey, regional shipowners did show a greater interest in Arctic activities (Lasserre & Pelletier, 
2011), confirming other findings that local traffic is predicted to grow.  
The majority of the literature assumes that transportation through the arctic will increase 
because there is the assumption that a shorter route is more desirable (Lasserre & Pelletier, 
2011). In contrast, Lasserre and Pelletier found a lack of enthusiasm for Arctic shipping among 
shipowners who had potential to operate in the Arctic. They argue that there are many 
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assumptions in the economic assessments of Arctic transportation and therefore the stated 
theoretical advantage is uncertain due to other financial and infrastructural investments necessary 
to enable Arctic transportation.  
Risk and cost were some of the reasons shipowners were not interested in expanding into 
Arctic transportation. Lasserre and Palletiere (2011) found that perception and persistence of risk 
was a common factor for why shipowners were hesitant to invest in Arctic transportation. These 
risks include the uncertainty of ice extent, lack of port facilities and navigational aids, inaccuracy 
of charts, and inadequate emergency response centers (Stokke, 2012). Insurance policies require 
ice-strengthened ships, while owners are uncertain that these are still necessary. Other costs 
include the need for temperature controlled containers or vessels to prevent cargo from freezing 
(Lasserre & Pelletier, 2011). 
 
Figure 3: Ship traffic density in the Arctic in 2012 as determined from AIS vessel tracking system. Although the CAFF definition of 
the Arctic is delineated, the tracks are constrained to within the Arctic Circle. (Magnset & Izquierdo, 2013) 
 
C. Environmental Impacts of Increased Transportation Activities 
Although shorter shipping routes will result in environmental gains, including a decrease 
the amount of fossil fuels used by the industry, there are potential negative environmental 
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impacts for the Arctic. These include increased black carbon deposition, noise in marine habitats, 
discharge of wastewater, introduction of invasive species, and the potential for an oil spill. These 
threats are compounded because the ability of the Arctic ecosystem to withstand and rebound 
from environmental disasters is weak (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012). 
The most common environmental impacts from increased ship operation in the Arctic are 
projected to be bunker fuel spills and exhaust emissions (Geiselhart, 2014). One exhaust 
emission is black carbon, the soot from fossil fuel burning that when deposited on sea-ice could 
decrease local albedo and increase melting of sea-ice, having a direct impact on global climate 
forcings (Browse et al., 2013). Browse et al., (2013) model that the dominant source of black 
carbon deposited in the Arctic will be actually be non-vessel sources south of the Arctic Circle 
(Browse et al., 2013; Quinn et al., 2008). Therefore, although vessel-based emissions will more 
than double under high transit projections, less than 1% of black carbon aerosol is predicted to 
come from vessels transiting in the Arctic in 2050. 
For vessels in transit, there is significant ambient noise generated by the engines and 
propellers. This noise has the ability to impair behavior and communication of marine animals. 
With increasing ship traffic, there will be a greater magnitude of noise, and greater duration of 
noise as the length of the possible transit season expands. A study on icebreaker noise in the 
eastern part of the NWP showed that the noise was perceptible to belugas and narwhals in excess 
of 25 to 30 km away from the ship, and could potentially alter their behavior (Aguilar Soto et al., 
2006). A computer model of icebreaker noise indicated that vessel noise could mask beluga 
communications between 14 and 71 km and even cause temporary hearing damage in the animal 
if it is as close 4 km to the ship (Erbe & Farmer, 2000). 
Sewage and graywater discharges from vessels present a potential threat from the 
introduction of nutrients that can disrupt the balance of Arctic marine ecosystems. Sewage is 
water produced from toilets, whereas graywater is water from laundry, showers, and sinks. 
Increased nutrients, like nitrogen and phosphorous, from these wastewaters can lead to over-
enrichment of the water column, potentially causing harmful algal blooms and eventually 
hypoxic dead zones. Changes to the nutrient balance could have negative implications for Artic 
food webs (ASOC, 2013). 
As a result of the international nature of the shipping industry, vessels crossing the Arctic 
will originate from many different regions around the world. These vessels can be host to a 
 9 
variety of invasive species, like the larvae of mussels of barnacles that can be transported either 
via ballast water or hull fouling (Palmer, 2013). These invasive species have the potential to 
overrun the more delicate native marine species and disrupt Arctic food webs. The cold 
temperatures of Arctic passages may be conducive to the survival of invasive species that 
normally would have died in the hotter, tropical conditions of passages through the Suez or 
Panama canals. Shipping is the source of 69% of invasive species introduced into marine 
ecosystems, the greatest cause of marine invasive introductions (Palmer, 2013). 
The most devastating environmental catastrophe in the Arctic would be an accident like 
the Exxon-Valdez spill (Geiselhart, 2014). The potential environmental impacts would be 
significantly compounded in the Arctic than if a similar disaster were to occur elsewhere because 
of the complexity and high cost of response and clean up (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012). 
 
IV. Global Environmental Governance 
A. Defining Governance 
Governance is not defined by any one political structure, rather it encompasses the 
political economic relationships of institutions and the way these relationships influence 
identities, actions, and outcomes (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). Lemos and Agrawal (2006) define 
governance as “a set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and organizations through which 
political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes.” Young (2012) defines 
governances as a “social function involving the establishment and administration of assemblages 
of rights, rules, and decision making procedures intended to steer socio-ecological systems 
toward pathways that are collectively desirable.” Socio-ecological systems combine 
anthropogenic and biophysical factors. Institutions are defined as “sets of rules, decision-making 
procedures, and programmatic activities that serve to define social practices and to guide the 
interactions of those participating in these practices.” International regimes address a specific 
issue and are composed of institutions where the nation-state is the main actor (Stokke, 2012). 
As a result, environmental governance is variable in form (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). 
Governance is not the same as government. Governance actively involves actors beyond 
the state, such as communities, businesses and nongovernmental organizations (Lemos & 
Agrawal, 2006) and can involve informal rules and management of natural resources and space 
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(Rothwell & Stephens, 2010). Governance is  “a mode of governing that is distinct from the 
hierarchical control model characterizing the interventionist state. Governance is the type of 
regulation typical of the cooperative state, where state and non-state actors participate in mixed 
public/private policy networks” (Mayntz, 2002). When considering the maritime transportation 
industry, governance often includes shipowners, cargo owners, and insurers of the goods or the 
vessels (Arctic Council, 2009). 
These definitions set the stage for a form of management that integrates distinct 
institutions and many stakeholders across multiple spatial and hierarchical scales to sustainably 
manage natural resources and space. Based on these definitions, it is possible to propose a 
multifaceted solution to Arctic governance in Part VII that recognizes many different forms of 
governance and allows them to function together in a complementary and cohesive manner. 
 
B. Principles of Effective Global Environmental Governance 
Scholars of governance have identified the subsequent principles of environmental 
governance as necessary for managing global natural resources. These principles are all 
appropriate for managing maritime transportation and the Arctic Ocean. 
 
Situated in a Globalized World 
With increasing globalization, there is a need for governance to be situated in the global 
setting. Globalization refers to the linkages across the environment, society, and economy. 
Governance cannot be developed independent of global forces because of the influences of 
global climate change and the increasing interconnectedness through globalization (Geiselhart, 
2014). 
“The problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a 
whole” (UNCLOS, 1982), and thus the argument for global environmental governance is that 
environmental problems cannot be managed by any one nation state. Historically, this has meant 
that the nation state is the appropriate actor in global cooperation and international arrangements 
that have developed to address environmental problems (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). Arctic 
governance must recognize its global context because the environmental changes the Arctic is 
facing due to climate change are a result of predominately non-Arctic forcings. 
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Globalization can have positive and negative impacts on governance. Economic 
globalization leads to impacts on the environment at multiple scales, for example by intensifying 
demand for global goods, increasing pollution, and putting resource strain on the nation-state. On 
the positive side, globalization enables a freer flow of information. Globalization also empowers 
actors that previously would not have had a role in government; these actors are considered to be 
“networks of knowledge-based expertise (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006).” 
The shipping industry is inherently part of the globalized world due to the international 
nature of its business. Shipping has been described as “an international tool in the service of 
global trade. (Arctic Council, 2009)” One vessel traversing one route can travel multiple national 
and international jurisdictions, and be host to a crew representing multiple nationalities (Roe, 
2007). Shipping governance is often an attempt to encourage “harmonization and uniformity” 
across international maritime law (Arctic Council, 2009). 
 
Appropriate for Local Context 
While it is important to situate governance in the global context, it is equally important to 
implement governance that is tailored to unique local conditions. Young identifies one of the 
limitations of effective governance to be the lack of consideration for local biophysical and 
socioeconomic systems (Young, 2012). The local context refers to the biophysical, 
socioeconomic, and political conditions that are unique to the Arctic region. On a practical level, 
policy is often created at the national or international level and then implemented at the local 
level. Policy implemented at the local level is more desirable because the implementation is 
cognizant of local needs and constraints and can therefore be tailored for a more successful 
outcome (Roe, 2007). 
This principle is not inherently in conflict with the first because of “scale-matching.” 
Environmental problems cannot be solved on any on single scale. Therefore although issues like 
climate change require global action, there are cases in which local response in appropriate. The 
most appropriate scale of governance is one that contributes the most relevant information, and 
can respond quickly, and is able to address issues across multiple scales (Costanza et al., 1998). 
Maritime transportation activities face a unique set of challenges in the Arctic, including 
traversing ice-covered passages, facing hurricane-strength storms, and being in physical remote 
locations that make the Arctic a more dangerous than traditional open ocean routes (Ebinger et 
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al., 2014). Although it is important to situate transportation governance on the international scale 
as ships passing through the Arctic must pass through multiple national jurisdictions, the 
governance of shipping must include recognition of the local-scale context to manage risk and 
adequately prepare for Arctic conditions. 
In the context of the Arctic, local can also refer to the recognition and incorporation of 
local and indigenous communities living in the region. The more global the form of governance, 
the lesser the role is for participation by local constituents. Thus there are trade offs between 
managing environmental problems at the global level and including appropriate participants at 
the local level (Moss & Newig, 2010). 
 
Inclusive of Non-States Actors, Especially Industry 
Failure of state-centered international governance has led to governance that actively 
includes non-sate actors who had been previously excluded from the policy process: the private 
sector, social movements, and nongovernmental organizations. Due to the multifaceted nature of 
global environmental problems, these non-state actors may be appropriately situated to influence 
the sources of these problems by mobilizing public opinions and developing innovative solutions 
(Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). The Aarhus Convention explicitly states that “environmental issues 
are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level” (Rothwell 
& Stephens, 2010). As new actors become participants in global governance, there is a diffusion 
of political power and authority over environmental management (Haas, 2004). 
Governance in the Arctic needs to be inclusive of non-state actors, actively including 
industry into policy formulation and decision-making. Neoliberal policy has shifted governance 
towards private actors and market-based mechanisms (environmental taxes, voluntary 
agreements, self-regulation, etc.) since the 1970s. Voluntary agreements are created so that 
actors may meet environmental targets, for example lower sewage and graywater discharge 
(Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). 
There is an increasing role of the private sector in the shipping industry. Private capital is 
becoming increasingly prevalent and replacing state-owned maritime assets, such as vessels or 
and port infrastructure (Roe, 2007). Market-based governance assumes behaviors in which 
consumers who have a concern for the environment sway industry. The success of private 
environmental governance depends greatly on the ability of the private actors to internalize 
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environmental protections among their stakeholders. An example of successful inclusion of 
industry into the governance process is the Malacca Straits Cooperative Mechanism, an 
agreement led by nations but that included industry (Ho, 2010). Limitations of successful private 
governance include concerns over potential loss of economic competitiveness (Lemos & 
Agrawal, 2006).  
 
Produce knowledge  
The presence of adequate knowledge is a basic characteristic that either enables or limits 
maritime transportation activities. Governance should ensure the production of knowledge and 
that knowledge will contribute to safe and reliable maritime transportation. 
Risk management is a critical component of managing risks associated with transit 
opportunities, but doing so requires the most accurate and up to date information (Emmerson & 
Lahn, 2012). Practical limitations to maritime transportation activities in the Arctic include a 
scarcity of information that would allow for safe passage and an absence of adequate response 
infrastructure in case of an emergency.  
There is currently inadequate ecological information for appropriate decision making and 
inadequate training for crews operation in the region (Eamer et al., 2013). There is an 
“infrastructure deficit” in the Arctic; only 5% of the Arctic is adequately charted for safe 
navigation, whereas as seen in Figure 3, a significant portion of the Arctic is already 
experiencing sustained traffic (Mangset, 2014). There is a need for increased availability of 
technical information on environmental (weather, sea, atmospheric) conditions to operate safely 
in polar conditions (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012). 
 
Provide sufficient infrastructure, including capacity for enforcement 
Another necessity for maritime transportation is the presence of infrastructure to ensure 
safe and environmentally conscious activities. Climate and ice projections will have implications 
for the type of infrastructure that needs to be developed. With increased availability of 
environmental data, there is also a need for greater physical infrastructure in the Arctic including 
new technology like higher class icebreakers capable of operating in icy conditions, aids to 
navigation, and local ports (Ho, 2010; IMO, 2015). Use of Arctic passages within the first half of 
the 21st century will require construction of higher-class ice-strengthened vessels and ice 
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breakers as will the decision to utilize the NSR versus the NWP. Waiting towards the end of the 
century, when there is a lesser-predicted extent of sea-ice, to utilize Arctic routes may lessen the 
extent to which vessels need to be fortified against the ice (Smith & Stephenson, 2013). A 
significant part of infrastructure is the capacity to enforce Arctic policy. It will be necessary to 
ensure compliance with environmental regulations to maintain the fragile ecosystem. 
 
Ensure environmental protections 
While neoliberal policy has been influential in modifying the focus of global 
environmental governance, it has not led to a form of governance driven by private agendas. In 
actuality, the increased role of private actors in governance has led to a greater concern for 
global environmental problems (Bernstein, 2002). 
Global environment governance should ensure protection of the Earth’s natural resources. 
Environmental governance in the Arctic needs to be proactive rather than reactive. An 
environmental catastrophe could wreak irreparable havoc on the unique ecosystem of the Arctic, 
and therefore it is imperative that governance look to mitigate damages to the maximum extent 
possible (Arctic Council, 2009). In the face of uncertainty in the Arctic, stakeholders should 
adopt the precautionary principle, and be conservative with their actions to minimize potential 
impacts (Costanza et al., 1998).  
 
Flexible and Adaptable 
Governance of natural resources should be flexible and adaptable to respond to dynamic 
changing environmental, political and social conditions (Costanza et al., 1998). This uncertainty 
makes governance difficult, and a politically and financially costly process to evaluate (Lemos & 
Agrawal, 2006). A flexible and adaptable regime would require deliberate approaches to 
uncertainty and increase capacity for rapid response (Young, 2012). An adaptable regime can 
have two approaches: a) adaptive, where governance response to changes as they are occurring, 
or b) anticipatory, governance that emphasizes changes that are expected to occur in the future 
(Young, 2012). These approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
In the Arctic, governance needs to be capable of working with uncertainty of the 
changing environments and consequences due to climate change. This involves managing actual 
and perceived environmental risk (CAFF, 2013; Eamer et al., 2013). 
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V. Defining the Arctic 
Part of the complexity of managing the Arctic emerges from the problem that there is no 
one definition of the Arctic (Table 1), and existing governance bodies are managing disparate 
spatial areas. The most simplistic definition is one that considers the Arctic to be all land and sea 
north of the Arctic Circle at 66° N (Figure 5). Arctic countries consider the boundary to be the 
60° N parallel. The latter definition covers a land and sea area of 30 million square kilometers 
(Geiselhart, 2014). Various bodies delineate the Arctic differently based on the needs of their 
programs; other natural boundary features include the 10°C isotherm, the treeline because it 
represents the boundary between forest and tundra, or the isohaline between the cool marine 
waters of the Arctic Ocean and the warmer, more saline waters of the Atlantic (AMAP, 1998). 
These distinct definitions have implications for the extent of governance. For governance 
that appropriately considers the maritime transportation industry, the boundary definition of the 
Arctic needs to consider the geophysical reality of the Arctic environment and must include all 
waters that comprise similar polar transit conditions. This is necessary to ensure that uniform 
standards are applied across the region. The most appropriate definition for governing shipping is 
therefore that proposed by AMAP, as it encompasses areas below the Arctic Circle, including the 
Alaskan Aleutian Islands, an area of significant, but high risk, maritime transportation. 
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Table 1: Formal definitions of the Arctic. 
Source Definition Graphical Representation 
International 
Maritime 
Organization 
(IMO, 2009) 
Arctic waters means those waters which are 
located north of a line extending from 
latitude 58°00’. N, longitude 042°00’.0 W to 
latitude 64°37’.0 N, longitude 035°27’.0 W 
and thence by a rhumb line to latitude 
67°03’.9 N, longitude 026°33’.4 W and 
thence by a rhumb line to Sørkapp, Jan 
Mayen and by the southern shore of Jan 
Mayen to the Island of Bjørnøya and thence 
by a great circle line from the Island of 
Bjørnøya to Cap Kanin Nos and thence by 
the northern shore of the Asian continent 
eastward to the Bering Strait and thence from 
the Bering Strait westward to latitude 60° N 
as far as Il’pyrskiy and following the 60th 
North parallel eastward as far as and 
including Etolin Strait and thence by the 
northern shore of the North American 
continent as far south as latitude 60° N and 
thence eastward along parallel of latitude 
60°.N, to longitude 56°37’.1 W and thence to 
the latitude 58°00.0’ N, longitude 042°00’.0 
W 
 
Figure 4: IMO Definition of the Arctic. (IMO, 2009) 
 17 
Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment 
Program (AMAP), A 
Working Group of 
the Arctic Council 
(AMAP, 1998) 
AMAP has defined a regional extent based 
on a compromise among various definitions. 
The 'AMAP area' essentially includes the 
terrestrial and marine areas north of the 
Arctic Circle (66°32’N), and north of 62°N 
in Asia and 60°N in North America, 
modified to include the marine areas north of 
the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of 
the North Atlantic Ocean including the 
Labrador Sea 
 
Figure 5: Boundaries of multiple definitions of the Arctic. (Lantuit, 2011) 
United States 
Government 
("Commerce and 
Trade Chapter 67 - 
Arctic Research and 
Policy," 2013) 
The term ‘Arctic’ means all United States 
and foreign territory north of the Arctic 
Circle and all United States territory north 
and west of the boundary formed by the 
Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; 
all contiguous seas, including the Arctic 
Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and 
Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain. 
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VI. Existing Management, Policy, and Governance in the Arctic 
International, regional, and national scale governance regimes have emerged to manage 
the growing development in the Arctic. Governance actors have been tasked with managing the 
safety, infrastructure, and environmental impacts of Arctic transportation activities. On the most 
basic level, jurisdiction in the Arctic is defined by the United Nations Conventions on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). New regimes emerging to provide regional guidance for activities in the 
Arctic include an expansion of existing treaties under the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) through the Polar Code and increasing scope and capacity of the Arctic Council. There is 
an increasing presence of non-state actors in the Arctic to provide further guidance on 
management of industry activities. In this section, each of the existing regimes for the 
management of Arctic maritime transportation are described and then assessed according to the 
global environmental governance principles outlined in Section IV.  
 
A. Law of the Sea 
 The United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is considered to be the 
“constitution of the oceans.” The convention divides up the ocean into national and international 
jurisdictions and, as related to shipping, defines appropriate legislation and enforcement over 
maritime transportation occurring in these jurisdictions (Arctic Council, 2009).  
The first interaction between UNCLOS and the maritime transportation industry in the 
Arctic is the designation between flag states and coastal states. The priority of coastal states is to 
ensure environmental protections and enforcement of national policies whereas flag states desire 
freedom of navigation (Arctic Council, 2009). Flag states refers to the nation under which a 
vessel is registered. The state in which a vessel is registered has the right to enforce standards 
upon ships of its nationality (UNCLOS, 1982). 
Coastal states adjacent to Arctic waters have jurisdiction out to 200 nautical miles from 
their shorelines. The zones in this area include internal waters, territorial sea, the contiguous 
zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and extended continental shelf where applicable, and 
each of these zones have respectively decreasing levels of coastal state jurisdiction. Six nations 
have EEZs that extend into the Arctic Circle (Figure 6). Coastal states have the responsibility to 
designate sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as they see fit in their territorial sea under 
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Article 21, especially where tankers, nuclear-powered vessels, and any vessel carrying hazardous 
materials is concerned (UNCLOS, 1982).   
 
Figure 6: Exclusive economic zones and 
extended continental shelf claims in the 
Arctic. ("Suddenly, a wider world below the 
waterline," 2009) 
Marine environmental 
protection is outlined in Part XIII 
of UNCLOS, clearly stating that 
all “States have the obligation to 
protect and preserve the marine 
environment” (UNCLOS, 1982). 
As pertinent to shipping, in EEZs, 
coastal states may only designate 
pollution prevention and control 
regulations within their EEZs 
(Arctic Council, 2009); these 
standards cannot be stricter than 
the those set by the IMO because they impair freedom of navigation. Nations can only enforce 
vessel-based pollution incidents when there is a “substantial discharge” (UNCLOS, 1982).   
Extended continental shelf claims only provide sovereign rights over the seabed, and are 
driven by mineral and hydrocarbon prospecting ("Suddenly, a wider world below the waterline," 
2009). Canada, Denmark, and Russia have all made claims on the Lomonosov Ridge, as 
illustrated in dark blue in Error! Reference source not found. (Geiselhart, 2014). Russia went 
as far as to place a titanium Russian flag on the subsea in the area of its claim (Kolcz-Ryan, 
2009). 
The United States is not a signatory to the Law of the Sea Convention although it 
voluntarily complies with the majority of its provisions. Ratifying UNCLOS is considered one of 
the best ways to protect US interests in the Arctic (this argument often is for securing access and 
rights to energy and mineral resources) (Kolcz-Ryan, 2009). If the US does not ratify UNCLOS, 
it cannot be a part of discussions regarding seabed mining and extended continental shelf claims 
in the Arctic (Admiral Papp, 2014). Similarly, becoming a signatory would codify the US’ right 
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to enforce security in the Arctic along the nation’s extensive coastline and the jurisdictional 
boundaries defined in UNCLOS (Kolcz-Ryan, 2009).  
Under UNCLOS, Russia claims the NSR to be under its primary jurisdiction because of 
claims of historic use of those waters. This allows Russia to establish rules of conduct and even 
collect fees for transit by non-Russian vessels (described further in detail in Part VI, Subsection 
4). In contrast, The United States considers the NSR to be an international strait as defined under 
Article 37 of UNCLOS, which would then allow for freedom of transit allowed under High Seas 
freedoms. The US is the only nation that continues to challenge Russia’s claim to Arctic waters, 
most likely the result of post-Cold War relations (Rossi, 2014). Despite political conflicts with 
Russia in other realms, many representatives of Arctic nations see the Arctic as a potential for 
collaboration with Russia because the Russian Federation has been very proactive in engagement 
in Arctic governance (Admiral Papp, 2014; Arctic 2014: Who Gets a Voice and Why it Matters).  
 
Evaluation based on Governance Criteria 
Situated in a Globalized World 
Multilateral agreements like treaties through UNCLOS and the IMO (discussed below) 
are beneficial because they are legally binding for all signatories, encouraging standardized 
practices across the globe. This is particularly important for the maritime transportation industry 
because any route through that Arctic passes through multiple national jurisdictions (Admiral 
Papp, 2014). 
Appropriate for Local Context 
A criticism of UNCLOS in regulating the Arctic is that its scope is so broad and many of 
the terms are so ambiguous that it does not meet the regulatory and governance needs specific to 
the Arctic. The only section of UNCLOS specifically related to polar regions is Article 234 in 
Section 8: Ice Covered Areas1 and it only applies to ice-covered areas within a coastal state’s 
                                                
1 Article 234: Coastal States have the right adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-
covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe 
climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create 
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could 
cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and 
regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment based on the best available scientific evidence. (UNCLOS, 1982) 
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EEZ (UNCLOS, 1982). This article gives coastal states significantly greater oversight than 
regarding a regular EEZ and recognizes the difficulties for safety and potential environmental 
ramifications of transportation activities in the region. Article 234 may decrease in relevance 
with the increasing impacts of climate change, because receding sea-ice extent implies less area 
that may be regulated under Article 234 (Johansson & Donner, 2014).  
Inclusive of Non-State Actors 
 Only state delegations were involved in the formulation of the Law of the Sea (Rothwell 
& Stephens, 2010).  
Produce Knowledge 
UNCLOS does not produce knowledge.  
Provide Sufficient Infrastructure, including capacity for enforcement 
 UNCLOS defines the parties that have the right to enforce governance of the Arctic, but 
does not provide capacity to do so. It similarly designates the responsibilities of port states, but 
provides no resources to increase infrastructure capacity.  
Environmental Protections 
Environmental protections under the Law of the Sea are primarily prescriptive and not 
enforceable by Coastal States, but there is limited enforcement jurisdiction under Article 21. 
There are specific “obligations” to protect the marine environment and at the time of its 
implementation, UNCLOS marked a shift from primarily jurisdictional marine issues to concern 
and management of environmental marine issues (Rothwell & Stephens, 2010). 
Flexible and Adaptable 
The process of creating, drafting, and approving UNCLOS took multiple decades, and 
even longer for the convention to enter into force. Because so many nations are party to the 
convention, verbiage is intentionally vague. Overall, this makes UNCLOS, and other similar 
internationally binding treaties very inflexible.   
 
B. International Maritime Organization 
Due to the international nature of the maritime transportation industry, ownership, 
management, and scope of ships can cover many jurisdictions. The establishment of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) stemmed from the need to regulate maritime 
transportation standards on an international level. IMO is a specialized, technical agency of the 
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United Nations and is responsible for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of 
marine pollution by the industry (IMO, 2015). The mission statement for the IMO, as stated in 
their 2012-2017 strategic plan is: 
to promote safe, secure, environmentally sound, efficient and sustainable shipping 
through cooperation. This will be accomplished by adopting the highest 
practicable standards of maritime safety and security, efficiency of navigation and 
prevention and control of pollution from ships, as well as through consideration of 
the related legal matters and effective implementation of IMO’s instruments with 
a view to their universal and uniform application (IMO, 2015). 
 
 The IMO was formally established by Convention at an international conference in 
Geneva in 1948 and entered into force in 1958. It was the first international body dedicated 
exclusively to maritime affairs. The IMO’s primary concern at time of establishment was 
international safety regulation and its first major achievement was the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) in 1960. But in the 1960’s, marine environmental concerns 
came to the forefront and the IMO began to develop regulation to minimize marine pollution. 
The Torrey Canyon oil spill of the coast of England in 1967 catalyzed IMO’s action in this field.  
 In 1973, the foundation piece of marine environmental regulation was established: the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. A 1978 protocol modified 
and absorbed the 1973 Convention and the resultant body of regulations is known as MARPOL 
73/78. It entered into force in October 1983. Since 1978, MARPOL 73/78 has been amended and 
expanded to cover new pollutants. MARPOL not only covers pollution from oil spills, but also 
provides framework for pollution from chemicals, goods in packaged form, sewage, garbage and 
air pollution (IMO, 2015). The committee that is responsible for the IMO’s regulations in the 
prevention and control of pollution from ships is the Marine Environmental Protection 
Committee.  
The IMO has adopted a comprehensive body of successful international conventions, 
protocols, and codes influencing almost every part of the transportation industry, including safety, 
environmental issues, legal concerns, technical cooperation, maritime security, and shipping 
efficiency (USCG, 2014). The IMO will also adopt codes that aren’t binding for the participating 
governments, but provide guidance in framing national regulations. It is even looking towards 
market-based measures that would complement a regulatory regime for the management of 
vessel-based greenhouse gas emissions (IMO, 2015). It is the responsibility of national 
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governments to implement the international standards adopted by the IMO, but the IMO will 
provide technical support to developing countries that are having difficulty adopting the IMO 
regulations. The flag state of the ship has ultimate responsibility for ensuring that its vessels meet 
standards, but port state control exists to catch that ships that escape proper flag state inspections 
(USCG, 2014).  
 
Polar Code 
The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, Polar Code for short, 
provides international regulations regarding safety and the environment for vessels operating in 
polar waters, both Arctic and Antarctic under the auspices of the IMO. It is the first mandatory 
legislation for vessels oeprating in polar conditions. Smith & Stephenson (2013) call for 
mandatory regulatory framework in the Arctic by the IMO to ensure environmental, safety, 
search and rescue standards. Because “supra-polar” routes can deviate outside of EEZs, there is 
need for cohesive international regulation.  
The IMO has four major committees; of importance in the Arctic are the Martime Safety 
Committee (MSC) and the Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) (Arctic 
Council, 2009). The Polar Code is being implemented through amendments to two major 
conventions of the IMO, SOLAS and MARPOL, as decided through meetings of the MSC and 
MEPC (IMO, 2015). 
Certification will be required to operate in polar waters. Certification would classify ships 
into three categories defining which conditions they could operation under: (A) medium ice, (B) 
thin first-year ice, or (C) open water or less severe ice conditions. The safety amendments fall 
under three general categories: design and construction of the vessel, operations and manning by 
the crew, and requirement of protective equipment. For example, under design and construction, 
vessels are required to be appropriately ice-strengthened for the type of conditions they tend to 
operate in, and be constructued of materials able to withstand polar temperatures. Under 
operations and manning, all vessels are required to have a manual on operating in polar waters 
and crew shall have training in navigational watch in polar conditions (IMO, 2015). 
Final ammendments to SOLAS were approved in the November 2014 MSC meeting. 
Draft environmental protections under MARPOL were approved in the MEPC meeting in 
October 2014 and are expected to be approved in May 2015. The amendments for polar activity 
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under SOLAS and MARPOL are expected to enter into force on January 1, 2017 for new vessels, 
and all previously constructuted vessels are expected to meet SOLAS requirments by January 1, 
2018 (IMO, 2015).  
 
Evaluation based on Governance Criteria 
Situated in a Globalized World 
Global maritime transportation standards are established on the international level (Arctic 
Council, 2009). Broadly for the industry, the IMO has been successful in establishing policy 
related to international safety, environment, and security for the maritime transportation sector. 
This policy is then implemented by lower jurisdictional layers, such as regional or national 
governments (Roe, 2007). Like with UNCLOS, these standardized practices make international 
transportation activities smoother, although because these standards are implemented and 
enforced by federal governments, interpretations of practices may vary from nation to nation.  
Appropriate for Local Context 
The Polar Code is the IMO’s response to providing context specific regulation for the 
Arctic. Because of the broad scope of IMO overall, multilateral agreements like the Polar Code 
are emerging to fit governance gaps in Arctic-specific management (Geiselhart, 2014). 
Inclusive of Non-State Actors 
Today the IMO is composed of 170 member states and three associate member states. 
The entire assembly meets every two years, but the council, composed of 40 member states, acts 
as IMO’s governing body between assembly sessions (IMO, 2015). Each member state is 
composed of a national delegation representing the interests of that state.  
 There are also a large number of intergovernmental organizations that hold observer 
status at the IMO. Formally this means that these organizations have agreements of cooperation 
with the IMO. There are also nongovernmental organizations, which have a consultative status at 
the IMO, and these organizations are predominately industry organizations (IMO, 2015). These 
organizations often represent the interests of the maritime transportation industry, including the 
cruise subsector.  
Produce Knowledge 
 The IMO is well recognized as the body to generate international standards regarding all 
components of the maritime transportation industry, from safety to environmental protections. 
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Provide Sufficient Infrastructure, including capacity for enforcement 
The Polar Code does not address the infrastructure deficit in the Arctic that is a major 
barrier to safe Arctic development, nor does the IMO have purview over port development and 
other necessary infrastructure developments. The Polar Code still allows for non-ice 
strengthened ships to operate in polar waters. This is a concern because many believe non-ice 
strengthened ships are inadequate for Arctic transits (Haun, 2014). 
Environmental Protections 
While the IMO is well reputed in establishing environmental protections and provides 
fairly strict environmental provisions through SOLAS and MARPOL, the response to the Polar 
Code by the environmental community is that it is weak and insufficient, especially concerning 
the environment. The environmental community is particularly concerned about the failure to 
phase out the use of heavy fuel oils in the Arctic, even though this is banned in Antarctica2 
(Haun, 2014; Thomson, 2014). No guidelines for reducing the dangers of Arctic oil spill are 
implemented, even though this was identified as the most possible damaging environmental 
catastrophe in the arctic by the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (Mangset, 2014). The Polar 
Code does have regulations concerning marine mammal habitat, but provides no similar 
guidance for seabirds (Haun, 2014).  
                                                
2 Many scholars cite the Antarctic regime as a potential model for comprehensive governance in 
the Arctic. In reality, there are many differences in the biophysical, political, and socioeconomic 
conditions between the two polar regions that result in Antarctic governance being inappropriate 
for the Arctic (Duyck, 2011; Johansson & Donner, 2014). 
There are geographic differences that make management of the two polar regions distinct 
from each other. The Arctic is experiencing the impact of climate change more dramatically than 
the Antarctic (Geiselhart, 2014). The Arctic is an ice-covered ocean bordered by continents with 
a small, but significant population. In contrast, Antarctica is a continent bordered by ocean, with 
no permanent human populations. Due to the currents and gyres around Antarctica, multi-year 
ice does not generally persist. In contrast, multi-year ice is a significant consideration for 
navigability in the Arctic (IMO, 2015). The Arctic, as an ocean, is already governed by 
UNCLOS, whereas Antarctica, as a continent, is not, so a new regime was needed for Antarctica. 
The Antarctic system cannot be applied to the Arctic because there has never been a need 
in Antarctica to balance environmental protections and development interests. Non-consumptive, 
scientific and conservation activities drive governance in the Antarctic (Johansson & Donner, 
2014). In contrast, new activity in the Arctic is being driven by potential for consumptive 
economic development.  
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Flexible and Adaptable 
As a binding agreement for its signatories, the Polar Code does not leave a lot of space 
for flexibility and adaptability. Although not as drawn out as UNCLOS, the process of creating 
the Polar Code still spanned at half a decade, and will take almost a ten years since its proposal 
before its regulations will be implemented. This timeline doesn’t allow for flexibility of change 
that may require responses within a shorter timeframe. The amendment process is also quite long 
and cumbersome, and therefore not conducive to adaptability. 
 
C. Arctic Council 
Globalization has led to the creation of new institutions dedicated to environmental 
governance (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006) and the existence of the Arctic Council is an example of 
this. The Arctic Council began in 1996 as a platform for discussing environmental issues in the 
Arctic. The Arctic Council was formed with the purpose of: 
promoting, co-operation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, 
with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic 
inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic ("Ottawa Declaration: 
Declaration on the establishment of the Arctic Council," 1996).  
 
The Council promotes Arctic priorities and research through ministerial meetings, Senior 
Arctic Official (SAO) meetings, declarations, and working groups. The SAO meetings serve to 
coordinate the organizations business and purpose. Declarations are deliberative, and help 
publicize the working goals. The Working Groups address a wide array of subjects regarding the 
Arctic. Through this work, the Arctic Council has found its niche in knowledge-building 
(Stokke, 2012). There are six working groups under the Arctic Council: Arctic Contaminants 
Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), Conservation of 
Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), 
Protection of the Marine Environment (PAME), and the Sustainable Development Working 
Group (SDWG) (Arctic Council, 2015). The Working Groups have an acknowledged capacity to 
project ideas and influence (Dodds, 2012). 
The Council is a project-driven institution with specific mandates in research on 
environmental processes and changes in the Arctic and the promotion of best practices for 
activities in the region (Geiselhart, 2014). The council cannot make any formal policy decisions 
 27 
as its original purpose was for cooperation and discussion. Its role and success thus far have been 
in identifying emerging issues and providing assessments (Young, 2012). Although more 
recently, legally-binding treaties have been negotiated under the auspices of the Council, 
including the Agreement on Cooperation in the Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in 
the Arctic (Geiselhart, 2014). Both Geiselhart (2014) and Young (2012) call for a more 
permanent infrastructure for the Arctic Council. 
 
US Chairmanship 
The foundational members of the Arctic Council are the Arctic 8, the eight nations that 
have territory within the Arctic Circle situated at 60°N Latitude. These are Canada, Denmark 
(via jurisdiction over Greenland and Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian 
Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America. Cooperation between the eight Arctic 
nations has existed for over 20 years. Before the Arctic Council, these nations were part of the 
1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (Koivurova, 2009). Koivurova (2009) is 
concerned that involvement by member states can be low because the of the “soft law” nature of 
the Arctic Council; the council was created by declaration and not a binding treaty.   
The chair of the Arctic Council is a two-year duty and rotates between each of the eight 
Arctic Council member nations. From 2015 to 2017, the US will take over the chairmanship of 
the Arctic Council for the first time, with Secretary Kerry and the Department of State 
spearheading the US’ agenda. It is in opportunity for the nation to not only elevate foreign policy 
issues, but also address the Arctic’s role in climate change and demonstrate the US’ commitment 
to acting on and mitigating climate change.  
To demonstrate a commitment to Arctic issues, Secretary Kerry appointed Admiral Papp 
in the summer of 2014 as Special Representative. Commander Papp is uniquely qualified for this 
position because of his history with the Coast Guard (Admiral Papp, 2014).” Admiral Papp’s 
largest concern about increasing maritime traffic is the absence of navigational safety measures 
to protect crew, ships, and the environment. The International Maritime Organization is 
developing the Polar Code to address some of these issues, which he has confidence will be a 
good start to improving safety. (Admiral Papp has been the head of the US delegation to the IMO 
in past years).   
 28 
Overall, Admiral Papp has called on the need for the eight Arctic nations to work 
collaboratively and emerge as leaders in Arctic governance, particularly in regards to safety. This 
emphasis on safety echoes Admiral Papp’s background in safety and environmental management 
at the USCG (Admiral Papp, 2014). 
  
Evaluation based on Governance Criteria 
Situated in a Globalized World 
 The Arctic Council develops linkages between nations interested in the resources of the 
Arctic. In its inclusion of states beyond those adjacent to the Arctic, the Arctic Council has 
recognized its role in the globalized world.  
Appropriate for the Local Context 
 Of the governance regimes analyzed, the Arctic Council is the only entity focused 
entirely on local, Arctic issues. The Arctic has been the sole focus since the creation of the 
Council by the Ottawa Declaration (1996).  
Inclusive of Non-State Actors 
 The Arctic Council actively incorporates diverse stakeholders through participant and 
observer statuses. 
 There are six permanent participants of the Arctic Council who represent interests of 
local indigenous communities. They are the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Aleut 
International Association (AIA), Gwich’in Council International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar 
Council (ICC), Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), and the 
Saami Council (SC). The member states need to consult with permanent participants before 
decisions are made, solidifying the role of indigenous communities in Arctic governance 
decisions (Koivurova, 2009).  
As of the end of 2014, there were 32 permanent observers3 to the Arctic Council. These 
observers represent non-Arctic nation-states, multilateral bodies, educational institutions, and 
                                                
3 Full List of Permanent Observers as of 2015: 
Non-Arctic Nations: France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, 
People’s Republic of China, Italian Republic, State of Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Republic of Singapore, and the Republic of India. 
Intergovernmental and Inter-Parliamentary Organizations: International Federation of Red Cross 
& Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
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nongovernmental organizations, but do not include representatives of industry (Arctic Council, 
2015). These non-Arctic nations, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore, are 
economically driven by the potential for maritime transportation in the Arctic. Ports in Korea and 
Singapore are major transportation centers that could be hub ports for transit in the Arctic. Korea 
also has the second largest ship building industry, specializing in LNG and icebreakers, two 
types of vessels that are increasingly in demand with growing activities in the Arctic (Arctic 
2014: Who Gets a Voice and Why it Matters). These nations are also investing in their own 
icebreakers so that they can take advantage of Arctic routes.  
There are transportation interest beyond the eight member nations of the Arctic Council 
(Ho, 2010). Although the Arctic 8 are hesitant to increase participation in the Arctic Council to 
non-Arctic nations, they recognize the importance of avoiding other nations creating their own, 
competing, Arctic governance regime (Arctic 2014: Who Gets a Voice and Why it Matters). 
Permanent observer nations of the Arctic Council, specifically those with interests in the 
resources of the Arctic should be involved in the management of the region (Geiselhart, 2014). 
Outside interests (non-Arctic nations) should not come to dominate Arctic management, yet 
theses stakeholders cannot be ignored (Young, 2012). 
Produce Knowledge  
The Council produces a discourse around environmental change and governance in the 
Arctic, portraying itself as an effective agent and reputable body to address such issues (Dodds, 
2012). The Arctic Council’s niche is in producing technical recommendations and influential 
scientific assessments (Koivurova, 2009). Although the Council successfully produces technical 
information via its working groups, a critique of this is that the groups function independently of 
                                                                                                                                                       
(IUCN), Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM), Nordic Environment Finance Corporation 
(NEFCO), North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), Standing 
Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE), United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). 
Non-governmental organizations: Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas (ACOPS), 
Arctic Institute of North America (AINA), Association of World Reindeer Herders 
(AWRH), Circumpolar Conservation Union (CCU), International Arctic Science 
Committee (IASC), International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA), 
International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH), International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Northern Forum (NF), University of the Arctic (UArctic) 
and the World Wide Fund for Nature – Global Arctic Program (WWF). 
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each other and therefore it is difficult for the Council as a whole to address the interrelations 
between problems assessed (Johansson & Donner, 2014).  
Provide Sufficient Infrastructure, including capacity for enforcement 
 Because the Council cannot make policy, it does not have the resources or the authority 
to develop physical infrastructure in the Arctic, although it may advise other actors in its 
creation.   
Environmental Protections 
Although the Arctic Council was created as a platform for discussing environmental 
issues in the Arctic, because the Council cannot mandate policy it cannot actively ensure 
environmental protections in the region. Indirectly, the reports of its working groups can inform 
other institutions in the policy formulation process. Thus far, these reports have been successful 
in identifying environmental threats and recommending guidelines for a remedial course of 
action for its members (Johansson & Donner, 2014). Much of the environmental protections and 
conservation in the Arctic is promoted by international NGOs (Arctic Council, 2009). 
Flexible and Adaptable 
A benefit of the Arctic Council is that it is classified as “soft law,” which allows for 
greater flexibility in its priorities (Johansson & Donner, 2014). There is nothing inevitable about 
the focus and scope of the Arctic Council. Dodds (2012) describes the Council as a “forward-
facing organization,” one designed to address emerging challenges. To do so, the Arctic Council 
strives for an adaptable rule-making strategy that can allow for amendments (Johansson & 
Donner, 2014). 
 
D. Domestic Legal Regimes and Capacity of Arctic Nations 
Although there are eight distinct nations whose national regimes impact Arctic 
transportation activities, this paper selectively addresses the United States and the Russian 
Federation as their regimes fall on opposite ends of the capacity spectrum in the Arctic.  
United States 
The US has explicitly stated the strategic importance of the Arctic region for the nation. 
Its management of Arctic activities is spread across various agencies, but increasingly 
centralized in the State Department as interest grows (Geiselhart, 2014). The United States has 
very limited capacity in the Arctic, and management is falling behind the dramatic changes 
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occurring in the Arctic (Ebinger et al., 2014). The USCG has only two outdated icebreakers and 
does not have the capability to respond to events in the Arctic (Arctic 2014: Who Gets a Voice 
and Why it Matters).  
Russian Federation 
For Russians, the NSR has a connotation of being a “grand national transport corridor” 
for the purpose of producing natural resources and transporting goods to communities in the 
Russian Arctic (Johansson & Donner, 2014). In the Cold War period, the Arctic was seen as a 
potential hotspot for conflict between the USSR and the US because it was the closest point 
between the two warring nations (Koivurova, 2009). 
Russia has successfully implemented considerable transit regulations in the Arctic by 
using UNCLOS Article 234 as justification. All vessels intending to use the NSR must give 
notice to the Russian government by submitting an application and an “ice-breaker fee” for 
guidance by Russian vessels during transit. Other nations have not challenged Russia’s claims 
over these waters and have accepted them by complying with the regulations (Johansson & 
Donner, 2014). Russia is increasing its capacity for active management in the Arctic by investing 
in port installations, oil and coal terminals (Geiselhart, 2014). The development of this 
infrastructure is ensuring that Russia will be an integral part of safety management throughout 
the Arctic (Arctic 2014: Who Gets a Voice and Why it Matters). Shipowners have indicated that 
they preferred the NSR because of existing infrastructure and systems of transit (Lasserre & 
Pelletier, 2011), which made the passage more secure. 
 
Evaluation based on Governance Criteria 
Situated in a Globalized World 
 These domestic regimes primarily manage activities occurring in their own waters, but 
this management facilitates smooth global maritime transportation across the world.  
Appropriate for the Local Context 
 Although both nations locally manage extensive maritime areas in the Arctic, most 
management is done through existing international and national legislation. Very little to no 
legislation has been created by these two nations specifically targeting activities in the Arctic. 
For example, Russia manages parts of the Arctic under preexisting national legislation like the 
“Water Code of the Russian Federation.” US laws, which intersect with Arctic management, 
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include the “Coastal Zone Management Act” as prescribed in Alaska and the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 (Johansson & Donner, 2014).  
Inclusive of Non-State Actors 
Government officials set all strategy and policy on the federal level.  
Produce Knowledge 
National regimes do not produce knowledge to fill the “infrastructure deficit,” but could 
encourage local universities and scientific institutions to do so through grants and other support. 
Provide Sufficient Infrastructure, including capacity for enforcement 
 The actions of the Russian Federation have shown that Arctic nations are capable of 
enforcing jurisdictional and environmental regulations and have the capacity to provide 
emergency infrastructure as needed. The US is lacking in capacity for enforcement or emergency 
response. A study by the US Coast Guard indicated that the US should commission the 
construction of six new icebreakers to achieve appropriate involvement in the Arctic and 
Antarctic. The US’ current fleet is limited and old. In contrast, Russia has 40 icebreakers with 
more scheduled to be constructed (LaGrone, 2015).  
Environmental Protections 
 Because the Russian Federation manages its Arctic territory under Article 234, it is able 
to implement and enforce much stricter environmental regulations, including prohibitions on 
certain harmful discharges (Johansson & Donner, 2014).  
Flexible and Adaptable 
Overall, these actions of nations are not very flexible as they are embedded in larger 
national regulations that take a lot of effort to change. In the US, there is no political will to do 
so. There is slightly flexibility in that nations can quickly mobilize significant resources in 
response to any sort of disaster.  
 
E. Self-Regulation by Private Industry 
There is an increasing importance of cross-scale governance and market instruments 
(Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). Shipowners, insurers, and trade associations can drive maritime 
governance; often regulations will start out as industry practices before being adopted 
internationally (Arctic Council, 2009).   
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Insurers play a significant role in dictating what practices maritime transportation 
companies will follow in the Arctic. Lloyds of London, a major international insurer, has 
developed sailing guidelines for the Arctic in response to the Polar Code. Lloyds felt the Polar 
Code lacked clarity, which could lead to variations among national interpretations of the IMO 
guidelines. It is very difficult to get reliable data from the Arctic, which is a challenge for 
insurance companies when calculating risk (Mangset, 2014). The pioneering transit of the coal 
carrier, Nordic Orion, almost did not occur due to reluctance of insurers to insure the voyage in 
September 2013 (Stueck, 2013). 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a form of market-based, self-governance that 
depends on the actions of industry being tied to consumer preferences, specifically for 
environmentally conscious goods and services (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). CSR is appropriate in 
the context of the Arctic governance because both governance in the Arctic and CSR emphasize 
the linkage between growing activity in the region and the need to manage the potential for 
environmental damage. The foundation of CSR is that a business is accountable to its 
stakeholders and therefore businesses have a responsibility to conduct their activities in a way 
the stakeholders would approve (Johansson & Donner, 2014). Environmentally responsible 
actions by shipping companies in the Arctic are less obvious than terrestrial CSR practices 
because maritime transportation is already heavily regulated by national and international 
standards, such as those set by the IMO. 
The World Ocean Council (WOC), an international organization with the aim of 
increasing business input in sustainable oceans management, has convened meetings with the 
purpose of discussing industry interests in the Arctic region. In 2012, the WOC convened the 
Arctic Business Leadership Council Meeting to address the deficiency of industry involvement 
in Arctic governance processes (World Ocean Council, 2012). The purpose of this meeting was 
to gauge the potential for creating an Arctic Business Leadership Council that would facilitate 
interaction among industry representatives with an interest in the Arctic. The meeting 
highlighted that industries in the Arctic have a commitment to operating sustainably, but were 
concerned about negative public perception of industry activities in the Arctic. Business 
representatives also highlighted the obstacles created by a lack of environmental data and 
harmonization across jurisdictional standards. While this meeting did not create new governance 
structures, it highlighted the concerns and suggestions for the role of the business community in 
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the Arctic, and presented these notes to the Sustainable Development Working Group of the 
Arctic Council (World Ocean Council, 2012). 
 
Evaluation based on Governance Criteria 
Situated in a Globalized World 
Self-regulation or CSR works within a company that operates internationally, but this 
may lead to discrepancies among practices across transportation companies.  
Appropriate for the Local Context 
Industry is looking to fill gaps in local governance by self-organizing via forums like the 
WOC Arctic Business Leadership Council or developing their own more stringent rules like 
those put forth by Lloyds. 
Inclusive of Non-State Actors 
This is a form of governance dominated by non-state actors. Maritime transportation 
industries should also be cognizant of the role of indigenous groups, as indigenous lives will be 
impacted by transportation activities in the Arctic (Eamer et al., 2013).  
Produce Knowledge 
Industry contributes significant technical knowledge, management and practical 
feasibility (Arctic Council, 2009). The WOC Arctic Business Leadership Council meeting 
highlighted the need for greater collaboration between industry and government so that 
governments understood the infrastructural needs that would ensure safe and sustainable 
activities in the region (World Ocean Council, 2012).  
Provide Sufficient Infrastructure, including capacity for enforcement 
If private actors are interested in taking advantage of Arctic routes sooner, they could 
contribute capital and/or resources to the development of increased infrastructure in the Arctic, 
including funding icebreaker construction or bathymetric surveys. As private actors, industry 
does not have the authority for enforcement.  
Environmental Protections 
Self-governance enables private actors to enforce potentially greater environmental 
standards, but the lack of uniformity across businesses impairs the overall strength of the 
protections. A concern regarding the role of private industry is that actors who have greater 
access to resource and expertise are likely to receive greater benefits. The fear is that if private 
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actors become more influential in the process, those responsible for the environmental 
degradation will then be those same actors setting the policy agenda (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006).  
Flexible and Adaptable 
 Private-based governance is significantly more flexible than binding national or 
international treaties because they are not constrained to functioning on the slow timescales of 
state-driven management. Similarly, business and industry have the capital to be innovative with 
their actions in a way the government does not have capacity to be.  
 
VII. Evaluating Arctic Governance: Successes and Gaps  
Current governance in the Arctic exists across multiple scales and levels, across binding 
and voluntary agreements, and public and private actors. While Arctic institutions successfully 
contribute to global environmental governance in the region, there are still gaps that exist across 
institutions and an overall lack of synthesis between institutions (Johansson & Donner, 2014). 
The evaluation of the existing governance institutions based on ideal characteristics of global 
environmental governance is summarized in Table 2. Each of the Arctic institutions is fulfilling 
at least one of the governance characteristics, indicating that existing governance institutions 
successfully contribute to overall governance in the region.  
 A networked form of governance in the Arctic would fill these gaps and bridge 
successful qualities of each of the Arctic institutions. Based on an evaluation of 
recommendations for Arctic governance regimes proposed by scholars, I suggest that an 
expansion of the role of the Arctic Council would facilitate networked governance in the Arctic. 
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 Table 2: Summary of successes and gaps in Arctic governance among existing governance regimes. 
Characteristic UNCLOS IMO Arctic Council National Regimes Industry 
Situated in a 
Globalized World 
Appropriate for 
Local Context Polar Code 
Inclusive of Non-
State Actors 
through member 
states and via 
consultative status of 
IGOs and NGOs 
as an observer or 
through nation-states, 
increased definition 
of observers 
varies among 
Arctic nations 
varies among 
Arctic nations 
Knowledge 
Production 
Adequate 
Infrastructure 
depends on the 
nation 
Environmental 
Protections 
Article 192, 
prescriptive. Some 
enforcement 
through Article 21 
Good internationally, 
but relatively weak in 
the Arctic 
weak, but not 
nonexistant  
depends on 
priorities of the 
nation 
uneven across 
companies 
Flexible and 
Adaptable 
IMO as a whole 
generally flexible, the 
Polar Code is not as a 
binding agreement. 
has the capacity 
to be innovative 
Successful 
Gap 
Partially, or has the potential to be succesful 
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A. Bridging the Gaps: Networked Governance in the Arctic 
Environmental problems are distributed across many spatial, sociopolitical, and temporal 
scales. The interconnectedness of environmental systems requires holistic governance and spans 
multiple agencies, yet historically, policy has evolved to address discrete problems (Haas, 2004). 
Networked governance is intended to counteract siloed, sectoral institutions and create an 
environment of governance that is conducive to cooperation and compromise (Lemos & 
Agrawal, 2006).  
A networked form of governance, where institutions work together to form a network of 
governing institutions, requires involved actors to consider how their actions will influence the 
other governance stakeholders (Haas, 2004). Networked global governance is the appropriate 
regime structure to incorporate all the principles of global environmental governance identified 
in Section IV and apply them in the Arctic. This governance model recognizes existing 
governance bodies and streamlines and improves their performance (Haas, 2004). An Arctic 
Regime Complex would be the implementation of networked governance in the region. Young 
(2012) describes a regime complex as “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical 
institutions governing a particular issues-area.” The array of institutions in the Arctic already 
includes UNCLOS, the IMO, the Arctic Council, national regimes, and private industry. 
Networked governance is a combination of multilevel, niche, and hybrid forms of governance.  
 
B. Multilevel and Niche Governance 
Multilevel governance is defined as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers – ‘supranatural, national, regional and local.’ (Roe, 
2007).” The concept of multilevel governance combines well with a niche oriented approach to 
governance where each institution within the nested governance specializes in a task of 
governance, for example, capacity building or rule enforcement (Stokke, 2012). A niche 
approach is distinctive from siloed governance because niche approaches divide institutions by 
general governance tasks (eg. capacity building, knowledge acquisition, communication) 
whereas siloed governance divides institutions by sector (eg. fisheries, shipping, energy).  
Multilevel governance is the middle road between one fully integrated governance 
structure (like a legally binding agreement) and siloed management schemes (Young, 2012). To 
have an effective network of governance institutions, it is imperative to define the division of 
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labor among actors, identifying the comparative advantage of each institution (Haas, 2004). For 
example, the release of pertinent environmental information related to climate change by one 
actor may influence the regulations of another actor. In another example, the Arctic Council is 
well situated to focus on support to the IMO by enhancing local maritime infrastructure (Stokke, 
2012). 
In multilevel governance, each jurisdictional layer is responsible for policies relevant to 
that layer of the industry. Roe (2007) divides multilevel governance into two categories; Type I 
only allows for one well-defined institution per jurisdictional layer with minimal overlap of 
responsibilities whereas Type II encourages niche-based institutions that may overlap in 
jurisdictional layers. Roe (2007) contends that the latter type is more conducive to the maritime 
transportation industry because it situates governance in a globalized world. Hierarchical, Type I 
governance in the transportation industry may have in fact led to a failure of policy where top-
down policies were improperly translated to local implementation.  
Lemos and Agrawal (2006) describe multilevel governance to be superior at a) 
integrating scientific, technological, and lay knowledge, b) providing sufficient flexibility, c) 
involving multiple actors, d) aptly integrating state and non-state actors and recognizing their 
importance of equal involvement, and e) working across scales, among others traits (Lemos & 
Agrawal, 2006; Roe, 2007). These superior characteristics are parallel to many of the identified 
principles of global environmental governance (Section IV). Multilevel, networked governance 
fosters less formal communication and greater transparency (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). Young 
(2012) advocates the development of an Arctic regime that is flexible across issues and adaptable 
across time.  
 
C. Hybrid Governance 
Hybrid environmental governance is becoming more common as “pure” forms of 
government (market-, state-, civil society-based governance) are coming to depend on other 
systems of governance (Figure 7). The potential success of hybrid governance is that one 
institution in the regime complex can fill the shortcomings of other bodies in the governance 
regime. Centralized governments are coming to depend on local administrations and 
organizations to complement regional management efforts as they realize no one actor is capable 
of addressing all complex and multi-scale facets of environmental problems (Lemos & Agrawal, 
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2006). Haas (2004) considers slight redundancy within responsibilities of governance partners to 
be a good quality because it provides “insurance” against the possible decline or failure of 
another partner. Partner institutions in hybrid regimes also serve as checks and balances on the 
other actors in the regime (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006).  
Figure 7: Mechanisms of environmental 
governance. Strategies in the boxes represent 
opportunities for hybrid forms of governance. 
(Figure 1 in Lemos & Agrawal (2006))  
In the Arctic, potential 
private-public partnerships in 
governing the maritime 
transportation sector are an 
opportunity for the hybridization of 
governance. An increase in private-
public or private-social partnerships 
between the maritime transportation 
industry and governments, local 
communities, or other stakeholders 
can alter some of the industry “gaps” in Table 2 to “successes” or “partial successes.” For 
example, Petro-Nav, a bulk fuel shipping company, and Fednav, a dry-bulk shipping company, 
are two entities active in the Arctic that engage regularly with local communities when planning 
for Arctic operations. In Deception Bay, Fednav vessels maintain a single ship-width track to 
minimize the disruption of natural ice cover. In return, local residents provide real time 
information on ice conditions in areas of ship operations. In the Northern Labrador, ship tracks 
have been defined by agreement between the business and local residents; this ensures that 
residents are still able to utilize sea-ice transportation routes (PAME, 2014). This partnership 
between transportation companies and local communities led to a reliable flow of 
communication between stakeholders and minimized conflict between user groups.  
Non-state actors can contribute innovative tools to the policy process by providing capital 
and/or capacity which state actors do not posses. A Petro-Nav oil spill training drill that involved 
working closely with local stakeholders identified significant resources of local governance to 
respond to a potential spill from a vessel (PAME, 2014). The lack of adequate Arctic capacity of 
Arctic nations to respond to environmental disasters in the region shows potential for an 
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increased role of local communities to serve as focal points for disaster response. Building 
private-public partnerships related to environmental protections could help ameliorate some of 
the infrastructure deficit the Arctic faces.  
 
D. Formalizing Networked Governance in the Arctic 
 To ensure greater cohesiveness among Arctic institutions, of the various governance 
regimes proposed by Arctic scholars, I argue for the expansion of the Arctic Council to serve as 
an intermediary between existing institutions and to identify and actively fill governance gaps to 
facilitate a networked governance regime. This expansion of the Arctic Council could be the 
focus of a new Working Group or Secretariat of the Arctic Council. While we see successful 
examples of hybridization and multilevel governance working along the sides of the triangle 
(Figure 8), a formal body would ensure that networked governance occurs smoothly within the 
triangle. This third party institution needs to ensure equal representation of stakeholders between 
nations, civil society, and industry. 
The Arctic Council would be an appropriate entity to serve as an intermediary because 
they have already established themselves as a successful regional governance institution. Of the 
types of governance evaluated, the Arctic Council was the institution with the greatest number of 
successes in principles of global environmental governance (four of the seven principles were 
categorized as successes), followed by partial or potential successes in the remaining two 
principles (Table 2). The Arctic Council has already demonstrated success in engaging various 
participants; CAFF’s Arctic Biodiversity Assessment was an example of successful bridging of 
different stakeholder (national, NGOs) working towards a common goal. This would not require 
additional management and policy formulation capacity on behalf of the Arctic Council, but 
rather the ability to initiate policy creation and delegate governance tasks to the other existing 
Arctic institutions as appropriate. 
If Young’s (2012) regime complex were to be implemented in the Arctic, not every 
agency would be fully equipped to respond to all problems; instead institutions would specialize 
in one of the tasks of Arctic governance. Existing institutions may have the capacity to 
successfully implement certain governance tasks (Stokke, 2012).  To ensure that this complex 
works smoothly and cohesively, there needs to be strong and effective communication among 
institutions, which the new arm of the Arctic Council could facilitate. A greater emphasis on 
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communications in governance among nations and management agencies will ensure 
complementary practices among stakeholders. Establishing standard modes of communication 
would ensure transparency and that best practices are followed and promulgated (Geiselhart, 
2014). 
 
 
Figure 8: Networked governance in the Arctic. Adapted from Figure 1 in Lemos & Agrawal (2006).  
In contrast, Ho (2010) proposes that an integrated governance and regulatory framework 
based on UNCLOS is needed is the Arctic, yet a comprehensive, legally binding agreement 
along the lines of UNCLOS is contradictory to the growing understanding of environmental 
governance. The best design for environmental management is a loose, decentralized regime 
because they are flexible (Haas, 2004). Young (2012) similarly argues that a binding Arctic 
Treaty is not desirable because the process to create a legally binding document would be long 
and drawn out, similar to the Law of the Sea process. The resulting document would also be 
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duplicative of UNCLOS and inflexible, and many authors strongly believe that flexibility and 
adaptability in Arctic governance is essential to respond to the dynamic environment (Haas, 
2004; Young, 2012). If an agreement is achieved, success tends to be limited because 
international binding agreements tend to lack adequate enforcement (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). 
 A Regional Seas Agreement under UNEP has also been suggested as a potential 
governance structure for the Arctic. A Regional Seas Agreement is a cooperative international 
framework with the purpose of sustainably managing the world’s oceans (UNEP, 2015). Many 
of them exist around the globe, including some in the polar-adjacent regions like the North 
Atlantic and Baltic. As most agreements are composed of regional nations, an Arctic Regional 
Seas Agreement would have to be creative about including non-Arctic nations in the 
collaborative management of the Arctic Ocean. It is also possible for a Regional Seas Agreement 
to exist under the Arctic Council, but is limited in that the Council does not have a legal 
personality. The legal personality of an institution is the ability to conclude legal agreements and 
bring legal claims against other actors in international law (Duyck, 2014).  
 
Conclusion 
The shared zone has now become the rule rather than the exception. (Allott, 1992) 
 
Allot (1992) presents this idea of mare nostrum where all waters should be considered as 
“an area of power and interest shared by two or more state systems.” Nowhere is mare nostrum 
more obvious than in the emerging governance in the Arctic; multiple institutions on 
international, regional, and national levels govern overlapping spatial and sectoral regions of the 
Arctic. This “complicated mosaic” (Arctic Council, 2009) of governance in the Arctic 
demonstrates a need for greater synthesis between governing institutions in the Arctic.  
The Arctic has functioned and has the potential to continue to be a platform for 
international cooperation. Growing maritime transportation activities in the Arctic will face 
opportunities and threats associated with the environmental, political, and socioeconomic 
conditions unique to the region. Responding to threats in the Arctic will take collaboration 
among all Arctic nations, non-Arctic nations, and industries that have vested interests in the 
economic potential of the region (Arctic 2014: Who Gets a Voice and Why it Matters).  
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Existing institutions successfully address certain principles of global environmental 
governance in the Arctic, yet there is still significant room for improvement. A networked 
governance regime facilitate by a new arm of the Arctic Council could ensure greater 
collaboration and synthesis among actors. Implementing a networked governance regime in the 
Arctic provides the opportunity to leverage successful governing institutions, while recognizing 
gaps and developing methods to fill them.  
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